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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The gender gap in corporate management boards has been described as an issue of justice,
company economic performance and democracy. The note reviews the evidence on the
effectiveness of legal instruments as compared with voluntary regimes in narrowing the 
gender gap on corporate management boards. It also reports on the recommendations of 
international bodies on this matter. 
Attempts to narrow this gender gap in corporate management boards have drawn on an 
extensive repertoire of actions, ranging from legal instruments to voluntary regimes.  The
note identifies the several different forms of legal instruments and voluntary regimes. It
finds that legal instruments to enforce quotas are an effective and fast means of achieving
change. The use of voluntary regimes has led to some increase in the proportion of women 
on corporate boards, but the effects are significantly smaller and slower. The only instance 
of achieving 40% of each gender was through the use of legal instruments to enforce 
quotas. The use of voluntary regimes has led to some increase in the proportion of women
on corporate boards, but the effects are significantly smaller and slower. Very recently 
further legal instruments have been introduced that take a wide diversity of forms,
including of available sanctions; it is likely that such variations will have significant effects 
on the effectiveness of these legal instruments.   
The note identifies and reports on the positions and recommendations of nine international 
bodies on this matter.  These are: the European Parliament, European Commission, Council 
of Europe, United Nations (UN), OECD, European Women’s Lobby, EC Network to Promote 
Women in Decision Making in Politics and the Economy, European Trade Union
Confederation, and the World Economic Forum.  All these bodies note the need to narrow 
the gender gap in economic decision-making and call for policy interventions into this
process. They vary as to whether they recommend voluntary measures or legal 
instruments.  There has been a significant recent shift in opinion and practice by
governments towards quotas. The note reports on the recent development of legal 
instruments for quotas on corporate management boards in 13 countries: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain 
and Switzerland.
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Gender Quotas in Management Boards
1. INTRODUCTION 
The gender gap in corporate management boards is considered as both an injustice and a
drag on company economic performance (McKinsey and Company, 2007; Terjesen et al,
2009; Davies, 2011). In 2010 only 3% of Presidents of the Boards of the largest companies
in the EU27 were women as were only 12% of the Members of these Boards. This gender 
gap has narrowed only a little over recent years in most Member States of the EU.1 
Attempts to narrow this gender gap in corporate management boards have drawn on an 
extensive repertoire of actions, ranging from legal instruments to voluntary regimes. A 
series of recommendations and legislative activity has developed in the EU and beyond.  
This note has two main parts. The first part reviews the most relevant and recent articles
and studies dealing with the issue of gender quotas in corporate management boards and
assesses their conclusions regarding the effectiveness of legal instruments in comparison
with voluntary regimes. It identifies the several different forms of legal instruments and 
voluntary regimes; notes the range of evidence available to assess their effectiveness;
reviews the literature assessing what works, distinguishing between the arguments about
causes; and concludes. The second part provides an overview of the most important 
recommendations of international bodies regarding the improved participation of women in
corporate management boards. It includes recommendations by European and international 
bodies, and notes recent legislative developments.
2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENT MECHANISMS  
2.1. Introduction  
There is a repertoire of actions to narrow the gender gap in top corporate management. 
There are two major types of mechanisms: legal instruments and voluntary regimes.2 
Within each group there are significant variations in the practices. The next section details
the nature of these legal instruments and voluntary regimes. Data on legal mechanisms are 
summarised in Annex I. 
The key studies, reports and articles discussing the effectiveness of different mechanisms
are reviewed. Data on changes in the gender composition of corporate boards are
summarised in Annex II. Conclusions are drawn about the effectiveness of the use of legal 
instruments and voluntary regimes in narrowing the gender gap in top corporate 
management based on this review. 
A considerable amount of the discussion about narrowing the gender gap in corporate 
boards has focused on its implications for justice, economic performance and democracy. 
The implications of narrowing the gender gap in corporate boards for these matters was not 
the focus of this note, which concerns the effectiveness of the different mechanisms for 
narrowing the gap, rather than the justification for narrowing the gap. A short summary of 
this other literature is provided in Annex III. 
Data from the European Commission Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making. See Annex II. 1 
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2.2. Types of mechanism 
2.2.1. Legal instruments 
This section focuses on legal instruments to narrow the gender gap on corporate 
management boards.3 The first law to enforce quotas on top corporate boards in a
European country was introduced by Norway and it remains the only example of fully
implemented legislation (in the sense that the date for meeting the target has passed). 
Several other countries (including some EU Member States) have recently introduced quota 
legislation; however, none have yet (in February 2012) reached the date by which it must 
be implemented. Hence there is considerable attention paid to the Norwegian case; but this 
is not to the exclusion of these further developments.  
2.2.1.1. The Norwegian law 
The Norwegian law was passed in 2003. On larger boards, 40% of the members were to be 
of each gender; a more detailed specification was made for smaller boards (if 2 or 3 
members then there should be 1 of each gender; if 4 or 5 members, at least 2 of each; if
6-8 at least 3 of each; if 9 or more then 40%). The law applied to all publicly listed
companies and to state owned and inter-municipal companies, later extended to all
municipal companies. Companies had 5 years, until January 2008, to comply (though new 
companies formed after 2006 had to comply from the start). The law was passed as an
Amendment to the Companies Act (so the ultimate sanction is de-registration and hence 
dissolution of the company) (Storvik and Teigen, 2010). The Act contained a clause that if 
the companies increased the representation of women on their boards to the required level 
of 40% by 2005 the Act would not come into effect, but this did not happen (Teigen, 2011).
In January 2008, 77 companies (out of about 450) in breach received warning letters from 
the Bronnoysund Registration Center giving them 4 weeks to comply; in February 12 
companies got a second letter; in April 2008 all were in compliance (Storvik and Teigen, 
2010). 
2.2.1.2. Variations in legal instruments 
Several countries have recently enacted laws to introduce gender quotas on corporate
management boards, including: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Davies, 2011; EC 
Network, 2011; Pande and Forde, 2011; Visser, 2011; Lombardo, 2012). These laws vary 
in several important regards. Annex I summarises the legal provisions in different
countries. 
The variations in the legal mechanisms for the implementation of quotas include:
– 	 the severity of the sanctions or penalties for non-compliance (closing down of
companies e.g. Norway; comply or explain e.g. Netherlands);  
2	 There is a third potential process, ‘the pipeline’ in which slow change in gender relations in society are
considered to lead to equality everywhere, including corporate boards, without policy intervention. The remit of
this paper is restricted to the mechanisms of policy interventions.
3	 There are further legal instruments relevant to the creation of the environment in which gender gaps in the
economy and decision-making are reduced, such as equal treatment legislation in employment and related
matters (Walby, 2011); but these are treated as outside the scope of this report. For example, Burke and 
Vinnicombe (2008) recommend that targeted initiatives take place within a wider framework in which women’s 
employment and career advancement is supported (e.g. affordable quality childcare; strong work-family
reconciliation measures; paid parental leaves; gender equality in pay; anti-discrimination legislation; and
shorter working hours). 
6
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
   
     
 
 
   
  
  
 
      
  
  
 
 
Gender Quotas in Management Boards
– 	 the type of law used (Norway used Company law, but had at an earlier date 
considered using equality law. Storvik and Teigen, 2010); 
– 	 the length and nature of the timescale for reaching the target (immediate; several 
years to implement; step by step implementation of different proportions; no target 
date); 
– 	 incentives (e.g. in Spain the potential to have priority status for government
contracts);  
– 	 whether the law elapses after a certain period of time (e.g. temporary in the
Netherlands and Italy); 
– 	 size thresholds for the inclusion of companies in law (e.g. Spain, companies with
more than 250 employees and listed companies; smaller companies are sometimes 
exempted); 
– 	 the ownership structure of companies (publicly owned; limited liability; sold on stock 
exchange; private. The more public the more likely to be included);
– 	 the range of positions included (Board Membership; other Senior Management; e.g. 
Norway Board only, Netherlands both);
Legal context, national legal frameworks may be more or less amenable to the introduction
of quota law4 (e.g. French legislation was delayed by discussion of the constitutionality of 
affirmative action, before quotas were enacted in January 2011, Leclerc and Paddock, 
2011).5 
The newly introduced laws do not exactly copy the Norwegian law. One of the more
important variations is the severity of the sanctions available to enforce compliance. In the 
Norwegian case the sanction of de-registration, effectively the dissolution of the company,
was available through the use of company rather than equality law. Under the Italian law,
non-compliance results first in sanctions, and ultimately in voiding of the board’s actions 
(Lombardo, 2012; Bianco et al, 2011). 
2.2.2. Voluntary regimes 
A wide range of measures can be found within the category of ‘voluntary regimes’. They 
include the use of the ‘comply or explain’ principle; transparency in promotion and 
recruitment processes; education and training initiatives; corporate governance codes; and
charters promoting women in management. These measures have been clustered in
different ways.  
The Austrian Institute for SME Research (2010), working with several national partners
across Europe, produced an inventory of non-legislative initiatives taken by national
authorities, social partners and NGOs to promote gender equality in the workplace and 
4	 EU equality law permits the use of quotas in some employment circumstances: EU Treaty: Article 141 (4),
Article 157 (4) Lisbon Treaty states: “With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women 
in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or
adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to
pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers”. 
5	 European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field, workshop on positive action, annual 
conference, 4 October 2011, notes a forthcoming report on positive action (including company boards) by
Selanec and Senden. 
See Burri, S. (2011) ‘Discussion Paper, Workshop 1, Positive Action.’ Available at:
http://www.non-discrimination.net/content/media/Positive%20Action%20-%20discussion%20paper.pdf. 
The concept of positive action is also discussed in: Burri, S. and Prechal, S. (2008) EU Gender Equality Law, 
Available at: http://www.jafnretti.is/D10/_Files/Evr%C3%B3pul%C3%B6g.pdf and Fredman, S. (2009) Making 
Equality Effective: the Role of Proactive Measures. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender­
equality/files/makingequalityeffectivefinal2009_en.pdf. 
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details initiatives taken by individual companies in different industrial sectors (24 
multinational enterprises, 1 national company and 5 SMEs). Altogether 133 initiatives were 
identified and analysed, structured around the main types: labels; prizes/awards; charters; 
rankings/indices; and compendium of good practice. While some initiatives addressed all 
employers, others focused on enterprises active in specific sectors. Analysis of specific
company initiatives identified seven fields of intervention: recruitment, reconciliation,
retention, career opportunities, training, networking and communication. They note that
these initiatives can also be further distinguished by the target group, such as all male and
female employees, all female staff, or specific sub-groups of women and/or men. 
Warth’s (2009) review of strategies to promote gender equality in businesses draws on
national responses to a questionnaire issued in the context of the 15 year review of the 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. In addition to the voluntary measures identified 
above, she includes research and data collection initiatives, which are important in fostering
awareness of gender equality and in monitoring progress (an example of this might be the
e.g. European Commission Database Women and Men in Decision-Making). 
A broader categorisation used by Visser (2011) divides voluntary measures into three 
categories: Good practice in companies (e.g. setting targets; developing training 
programmes); cross-company and sector initiatives (e.g. awards, charters); and industry
self-regulation instruments (e.g. Corporate Governance Codes). 
Good practice in companies: Examples of good practice include training and mentoring or 
sponsor programmes and the implementation of voluntary gender quotas at a company 
level (For details of best practices in specific companies see: European Commission, 2007; 
Maier, 2011; Thomson, 2011; Burke and Mattis, 2005). 
Cross-company and Sector initiatives, including: awards, such as the long established 
‘Catalyst Award’6 for outstanding initiatives resulting in women’s career advancement;
charters (Women on the Board Pledge for Europe, European Commission, 2011a; the 
Danish Charter for more women in management, see Warth, 2009); databases of women 
interested in becoming board members (e.g. national databases in Norway, see Storvik and 
Teigen, 2011); networks (e.g. the European Professional Women’s Network); and 
mentoring initiatives (e.g. the FTSE 100 Cross-Company Mentoring Programme, see 
Thomson, 2011; the Austrian Government’s ‘Women-Business-Mentoring Programme and a
Cross-Mentoring project in the private sector, see Warth, 2009). 
Industry Self-Regulation: The key example of industry self-regulation are Corporate 
Governance Codes,7 which tend to take form of guidelines rather than constituting binding
measures, with non compliance requiring explanation in company reports (i.e. use of the
‘comply or explain’ principle). Corporate Governance Codes are adopted at a national level, 
and the EU framework promotes their application by requiring that listed companies refer to
a code in their corporate governance statement and report on their application of that code
(European Commission, 2011b).  
The threat of legislation to compel an increase in the percentage of women on Boards if one 
is not forthcoming on a ‘voluntary’ basis lies somewhere in between these two forms of 
‘compulsion’ and ‘voluntary’. The threat of introduction of quotas in Sweden is sometimes
seen as being part of the reason for the success of the ‘voluntary’ regime in raising the 
6 Details available at: http://www.catalyst.org/page/54/catalyst-award. 

7 For national codes, see: European Corporate Governance Institute http://www.ecgi.org/. 
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Gender Quotas in Management Boards
number of women on boards from 6% in 2002 to 22% in 2010 (The Local, 2012). In the 
UK, the Davies (2011: 2) report recommended a business led voluntary approach, but also 
that: ‘Government must reserve the right to introduce more prescriptive alternatives if the 
recommended business-led approach does not achieve significant change’. The Norwegian 
law also deployed the threat of coercive action if targets were not reached, which was 
ultimately activated (Teigen, 2011).  
2.3. Assessing effectiveness  
2.3.1. What evidence? 
This section reviews the effectiveness of legal instruments in comparison with voluntary 
regimes using evidence from data bases, academic reviews, reports from international 
bodies and governmental inquiries.
Annex II presents the data on changes in the gender composition of top corporate boards 
in the EU27 between 2003 and 2010, drawn from the European Commission Data-Base 
‘Women and Men in Decision-Making’8 (annual data collection covering the largest publicly
listed companies in each country, covering the positions of president: chairman of the 
board of directors, and members: members of the board of directors).  
There are further sources for data on the gender composition of top business positions 
including: the World Economic Forum,9 Catalyst10 and GlobeWomen Corporate Women 
Directors International.11 This shows a similar picture of very small proportions of women 
in top business positions.12 
Norway is the only case where legislation has been fully implemented. In several other
cases while the law has been enacted, the date by which it must be implemented has not 
yet been passed. However, there is some evidence of significant increases following the 
recent adoption of quota legislation in France and Spain (Corporate Women Directors
International, 2011). 
2.3.2. Assessing the Norwegian case: legally enforceable quotas 
Since Norway is the only instance of a fully implemented law on quotas, it is necessarily the 
main focus of discussions as to the success or otherwise of legally enforceable quotas. 
However, it is not unreasonable to consider whether the variations in the laws currently
proceeding towards their implementation date might make a difference to their outcomes.
The overwhelming majority of the studies reviewed consider that data on the increase in 
8 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making/database/index_en.htm. 
9 Corporate Gender Gap Report 2010. Available at:
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_CorporateReport_2010.pdf. 
10 Catalyst (2011) ‘Current Female Heads of Companies of the Financial Times Europe 500’. Available at: 
http://www.catalyst.org/publication/522/current-female-heads-of-companies-of-the-financial-times-europe­
500. 
11 Corporate Women Directors International (2011) Women Directors of the Fortune Global 200. Washington:
GlobeWomen. Available at:  
http://www.globewomen.org/cwdi/CWDI%202011%20Fortune%20Global%20200%20Key%20Findings.htm
12	 According to Catalyst, women hold 1.8% of Financial Times Europe 500 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) roles, 
with nine women leading companies (‘Current Female Heads of Companies of the Financial Times Europe 500’. 
Available at: http://www.catalyst.org/publication/522/current-female-heads-of-companies-of-the-financial­
times-europe-500). Data from 600 companies across 16 different industries in 20 OECD countries indicated
that the average number of women holding the CEO level position was less than 5%; the highest percentage of
female CEOs was found in Finland, Norway, Turkey, Italy and Brazil (between 11-13%) while 11 countries had
no female CEOs among the companies responding to the survey (Corporate Gender Gap Report 2010.
Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_CorporateReport_2010.pdf). 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
women on corporate boards in Norway demonstrates that legal quotas are the most
successful mechanism to narrow the gender gap in corporate boards (Hoel, 2008; Storvik 
and Teigen, 2010). Visser (2011: 10) concludes that progress on gender equality in
economic decision-making has been ‘glacially slow’. Legal quotas in law appear to be a
speedy solution to this problem: ‘This is a radical solution, but would certainly provide 
change quickly’ (Atkinson, 2011: 248). In reviewing the change achieved in Norway 
following quota legislation, Hoel (2011: 86) concludes: ‘The result by the end of 2007 is
stunning, compared to international developments.’ Despite years of effort in the form
voluntary initiatives in Norway, it was only with the implementation of a law with strong
sanctions that rapid progress was achieved (Rasmussen and Huse, 2011; Hoel, 2008;
Teigen, 2011). In the absence of quotas, there is a risk of progress stalling (Fagan et al,
2011). 
The Norwegian law on quotas worked, in the sense that the proportion of women on 
corporate boards rose as intended. The percentage of women on corporate boards in
Norway increased from 6% in 2002 to 9% in 2004, 12% in 2005, 18% in 2006, 25% in 
2007, 36% in 2008, reaching 40% in 2009 (Storvik and Teigen, 2010). 
There are no other countries where the percentage of women on corporate boards has 
reached 40%. The next highest countries are Sweden and Finland, which had 26% of
members of top corporate boards in 2010, rising from 18% and 12% respectively in 2003. 
Sweden and Finland were among the countries that had introduced a voluntary regime,
though in at least the Swedish case this has included a threat to legislate if the female
presence did not increase. By contrast, in the same period within the EU27 there was a
only small increase in the percentage of women on the top 50 corporate boards, from 9% 
in 2003 to 12% in 2010 (See Annex II for data from the European Commission Database 
on Women and Men in Decision Making). 
However, a series of caveats have been raised. These do not challenge the main argument, 
which is that quotas are the most successful mechanism to narrow the corporate gender
gap; rather they suggest that part of the change in the reported Norwegian statistics may
be linked to other factors including: methodological issues in the category of companies 
affected, additional voluntary changes, more general societal changes, and a specific
‘Nordic’ effect.13 
	 The definition of the category of companies affected makes a difference to the size of 
the quota effect. A few companies changed their legal status from public to private in
order to avoid the legislation, but this was a small minority of companies (Network to
Promote Women in Decision-Making in Politics and the Economy, 2011; Ahern and
Dittmar, 2010, cited in Pande and Ford, 2011). While the Norwegian statistics that 
show an increase from 6% in 2002 to 40% in 2009 are widely cited, the European 
Commission Database finds a change in Norway from 20% in 2003 to 39% in 2010. 
13	 There is a more theoretical debate about underlying causal pathways or explanations, but this is not the focus
of this note, which is oriented to ‘what works’.  In summary, there are of two main types: first, human capital
(skills, qualifications and expertise) and second, networks (are women known to the recruiters to boards) and
discrimination (men are preferred) (Atkinson, 2011; Walby, 2011). The human capital argument concerns 
whether women have sufficient skills, qualifications and expertise to be appointed to boards equally with men. 
This approach is similar to that concerning the adequate ‘supply’ of qualified women along the ‘pipeline’. There
is evidence that new female recruits to boards are at least as well qualified as new male recruits and indeed 
are more highly educated (Terjesen et al 2008). Hence an insufficient ‘supply’ of qualified women is not an 
explanation of their lesser presence. This leaves the alternative explanations, that women do not have
sufficient access to networks to be known to recruiters or that there continues to be discrimination against
women (whether direct or indirect). The use of active policy interventions through legal mechanisms and
voluntary regimes is necessary to address these causal pathways. 
10
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This EC database includes only the top 50 companies in each country; while the 
Norwegian data includes all publicly registered companies, since this is the pool of
companies affected by the legislation. Thus methodological issues introduce caveats
to the size of the effect, but these do not significantly affect the argument.14 
	 Norway did introduce additional voluntary measures at the same time as legally 
binding quotas. There were efforts to identify relevant women and also to train them
to take places on Boards, in particular, four data bases of relevant women were 
established together with a training programme ‘Female Future’ (Storvik and Teigen,
2010). The Network to Promote Women in Decision-Making in Politics and the 
Economy (2011: 11) notes that a number of factors combined to contribute to the
success of the Norwegian case, including the following voluntary measures:
professional preparation (e.g. training) of qualified female candidates; stakeholder 
cooperation to create support systems; and the availability of female role models.
	 While the wider social, political and economic context can influence the level of 
women’s representation on corporate boards, there is a debate as to how significant
this link is. On the one hand, Terjesen and Singh (2008) argue for a strong link based
on a 43 country study; on the other hand, data from Storivk and Teigen (2010) cast
doubt on the strength of this link, while Hoel (2008) offers data that shows that 
Norway had a different trajectory from other Nordic countries despite similarities in
social structure. 
Terjesen and Singh (2008) investigate the relationship between the gender gap in Board
membership and gender gaps in management jobs (using the category of legislative, senior 
official and management occupations), pay (ratio of earned income of men and women)
and timing of parliamentary representation. They create a data set of 43 countries using 
data from a range of sources, centred on 2003-5. They find that female board membership
was positively related to higher levels of women in management jobs, which is the pool
from which board members are drawn, and to lesser gender inequality in pay. The results 
on the relationship between Board membership and timing of parliamentary representation
are complex. They suggest that they have found that recent participation by women in
parliament is more strongly correlated with higher board membership than is earlier 
participation. However, the data is confounded by treating countries where boundaries 
between nations and states have been recently re-drawn as if they had no parliamentary
tradition or history. Since this is a controversial interpretation, their findings on the link
between boards and democracy are less robust. In sum, Terjesen and Singh (2008) show 
that higher levels of women in corporate boards correlate with higher levels of women in
management jobs and with lower levels of gender inequalities in pay in their study of 43
countries.  
However, data from Norway suggests that the wider social context is not sufficient to 
explain the dramatic increase in women’s presence on corporate boards. In Norway, while 
the proportion of women on corporate boards rose, adjacent phenomena such the 
14	 A series of tangential issues have been raised that do not directly pertain to the question of what works to  
increase the proportion of women on corporate boards. There has been debate as to whether the holding of 
multiple board memberships by women reduces the increase in the overall number of women board members
but this does not address the mechanism for reaching the quota target (Seierstad and Opsahl, 2011). There 
have been allegations that the quotas have a negative effect on women, undermining their professionalism
through implying that success may not be due to merit; however, Rasmussen and Huse (2011) argue there is 
scant evidence for this view and most is anecdotal. Furthermore, in the case of Norway, the initial resistance 
and heated arguments gradually disappeared (Network to Promote Women in Decision-Making in Politics and
the Economy, 2011; Visser, 2011; Hoel, 2008).
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proportion of chairs of boards or of top management who are women has remained low.
The proportion of the chairs rose only from 3% in 2002 to 5% in 2009; only 2% of CEOs 
are women; and only 10% of ‘top management’ is female (Storvik and Teigen, 2010). This
shows that the increase in women on corporate boards was not part of a general change in 
the position of women in senior management.
	 Hoel (2008) shows that the changes in the gender composition of corporate boards in 
Norway were not predominantly due to changes in the shared Nordic social structure. 
Norway has significant similarities in social, economic and political structure with
other Nordic countries, including Denmark and Sweden. This means that if structural
context was an important part of the explanation of the changes in the proportion of 
women in corporate boards, this should have increased in all three countries at the
same time. Hoel (2008) presents data on the proportion of female directors in listed 
companies in the stock exchanges in Copenhagen (Denmark), Stockholm (Sweden) 
and Oslo (Norway) in 2004 and 2007. In this period, the proportion of female 
directors increased from 8.5% to 10.0% in Copenhagen, from 16.1% to 19.2% in
Stockholm and from 15.9% to 37.0% in Oslo. Further Hoel (2008) notes the speed
and timing of company compliance, which is indicative of specific efforts to meet the
law rather than general social processes. In 2005 only 17% of companies were in
compliance, rising to 30% in 2006, 38% in January 2007, 60% in July 2007 and 77% 
in December 2007. 
Beyond the Norwegian case, there is variation in the legal mechanisms for the 
implementation of quotas in the new laws that are being enacted. It may be that these 
make considerable difference to the effectiveness of the law. For example, in the 
Norwegian case the use of ‘company’ law, rather than ‘equality’ law, enabled the use of the 
very strong sanction of dissolution of any company that did not comply. If the only sanction
is a fine, it might be that the willingness to comply will be different. Any variations in
outcome can be robustly assessed only after the date for reaching the target is reached,
although a weaker effect if the sanction is a fine rather than the dissolution of the company 
would seem likely.  
2.3.3. What are the effects of voluntary regimes? 
The argument that legal instruments have been the only way in which the proportion of
women on corporate boards has reached 40% does not mean that voluntary regimes do
not have some influence on the gender composition of the boards. There is evidence that
voluntary regimes make some difference; but it is overwhelmingly the case that it makes 
less difference and also that it acts more slowly. No country that has used only a voluntary
regime has achieved 30% of women on corporate boards, let alone the 40% that has been 
achieved with legally compelled quotas. This does not mean that it is impossible, just that it
has never happened. There are several studies on voluntary regimes, identifying their
components, discussing the reasons why they have effects and why these are relatively
limited.
Fagan et al (2011) find that ‘soft law’ recommendations in Corporate Governance Codes are 
more common than quotas and that their effectiveness varies. They conducted individual 
analyses of 8 EU countries (Finland, France, Hungary, Norway, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden, 
and UK) and note the degree of variation in the observed effect of these codes, having had 
some impact in Norway, Finland and Spain but no major impact in others. 
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Gender Quotas in Management Boards
A key problem in ‘soft law’ appears to lie in the satisfactory application and monitoring of
Corporate Governance Codes, an issue that is being consulted on by the European 
Commission in its green paper on the EU Corporate Governance Framework (European 
Commission, 2011b). A study of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms (soft law and
legislation) in EU Member States reached the following conclusion:
The comply-or-explain approach formally adopted by the European Commission in 2006 
enjoys wide acceptance by the corporate as well the institutional investor community. 
However, its practical implementation suffers some deficiencies, mainly in the form of
an unsatisfactory level and quality of information on deviations by companies and a low
level of shareholder monitoring (RiskMetrics Group, 2009: 188).  
In their study of non-legislative measures, the Austrian Institute for SME Research (2010) 
suggest that since the initiatives are only one element amongst a host of factors affecting
gender equality, it is almost impossible to assess the direct impact. Nevertheless, 
observations of increasing participation in initiatives and media interest led the Institute to
conclude that most of the analysed initiatives could be judged as successful. Such 
initiatives are also important in terms of creating a broader public awareness of gender 
issues in the labour market. Factors promoting company acceptance of initiatives (which 
indirectly impacts upon effectiveness) were identified. These include the flexibility of
initiatives (e.g. sensitivity to company size); adaptation in relation to labour market
changes; professionalism in organisation of initiatives (e.g. clarity and support for 
participants); clear monitoring and evaluation criteria; publicity (which can benefit the 
enterprise as well as improve awareness); and binding commitments with the engagement
of management. At the same time, various obstacles were identified, including: a lack of
diversity in terms of participating companies (e.g. popularity of initiatives with corporate
leaders compared with the difficulty in recruiting smaller companies); engagement in times
of economic crisis; and achieving a balance between the quality of an initiative (inducing 
change in crucial areas) and its accessibility (to secure a company’s voluntary
engagement). In a comparison of the initiatives in terms of likelihood of achieving long-
term effects and sustainable change, it is concluded that each has different advantages and 
disadvantages and are variously appropriate according to the specific situation (e.g. size of
company). More generally, they note that positive initiatives are easier to enforce politically
than punishments, and can be valuable in motivating companies to make changes in 
organizational structures.  
Warth (2009) makes similar observations in her discussion of strategies to promote gender 
equality in businesses, noting that voluntary measures raise public awareness of important
issues and can contribute to creating a consensus for more far-reaching measures by
governments, social partners and employers. Further, cultural change is perceived as more 
likely with the voluntary commitment of stakeholders rather than with forced engagement
through legislative actions.  
McKinsey and Company (2007) investigated which type of company initiative was likely to
be more effective, using as evidence interviews with 12 companies noted for their progress 
in terms of women’s representation in the boardroom and top management. They identified
four best practices for the development of gender diversity: create transparency by
implementing gender diversity key performance indicators; implement measures to 
facilitate work-life balance (i.e. flexible working hours; long-term career flexibility); adapt
the human resource process to ensure systems do not prevent women’s advancement; and
help women master dominant company codes and nurture their ambition (e.g. via network-
building and mentoring).
13
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
     
  
    
  
    
 
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
Voluntary regimes are very varied. There are some examples of effectiveness at the
company level and in particular countries (Foust-Cummings, 2008; Austrian Institute for
SME Research, 2010; Warth, 2009). Voluntary measures can make contributions towards 
change by, for example, raising public awareness and promoting change in organisational 
practices; however, change by such methods has usually been slow and partial (Warth,
2009; Austrian Institute for SME Research, 2010; Thomson, 2011). There is a widely held
view that ‘soft’ programmes are a useful accompaniment to ‘hard’ measures (e.g. Warth, 
2009).15 
2.4. Conclusions 
The only policy intervention to have increased the proportion of women on corporate 
management boards to 40% is that of the legal instrument of quotas. Legal instruments to 
enforce quotas are an effective and fast means of achieving change. The use of voluntary
regimes has led to some increase in the proportion of women on corporate boards, but the
effects are significantly smaller and slower.  
The evidence base for the literature assessing the different effects of the two approaches is 
limited by the existence of only one example of a fully implemented law, although there are 
several voluntary regimes. However, the extent of the critical attention devoted to the 
Norwegian case suggests that this is a robust finding.
There is considerable variation among the legal instruments that are being recently
introduced as well as in the measures contained within voluntary regimes. It is likely that
these variations will be important in shaping the outcomes of policies. While it is not
possible to be definite about the implications of variations in legal instrument until the 
target date set by the law is reached, it is likely that the selection of legal instrument
(company or equality law) and severity of the sanction (from company dissolution to fine)
may have significant impact on compliance. It is already the case that variations in
voluntary practices, not least the nature and extent of the pressure to comply ‘voluntarily’,
have been  shown to affect the rate of narrowing of the gender gap. This means that in  
addition to the choice between legal instrument and voluntary regime, decisions about the 
type of method used are also important. 
While the separation of legal instruments and voluntary regimes is generally clear in most
cases, there is no reason why in practice they should not be combined. The use of 
voluntary measures as an accompaniment to legal instruments is widely supported.
Further, there are some measures that straddle the two, such as the threat to impose legal
sanctions if voluntary measures do not achieve their targets. 
15	 Warth (2009: 20) recommends a mix of policies: (a) Systematic analysis of the causes for obstacles to
women’s career progression; (b) Concrete commitments by employers and social partners to promote equal
opportunities at work; (c) Establishment of transparent recruitment and promotion procedures; (d) Further
development of mentoring for women and support through professional networks; (e) The introduction of 
mandatory gender quotas in economic decision-making bodies to establish gender balance and to create role
models for women. 
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Gender Quotas in Management Boards
3. INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
The most recent significant recommendations on the international level regarding the 
increased participation of women in corporate management boards are reported below. The 
bodies include the European Parliament, European Commission, Council of Europe, United
Nations (UN), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), European 
Women’s Lobby, European Commission (EC) Network to Promote Women in Decision
Making in Politics and the Economy, European Trade Union Confederation, and the World 
Economic Forum. The level at which these recommendations have been made varies
significantly, from fully agreed policy ratified by many countries, to statements made by 
senior officers of these institutions.16 They vary significantly in the extent to which they are 
tightly worded recommendations about gender gaps in corporate management boards or
are general statements about the importance of including women in economic governance 
and top jobs.  
A range of countries has recently introduced legal instruments and voluntary regimes to 
narrow the gender gap in corporate boards. The legal developments are summarised in
Annex I; they are not discussed here since they are not ‘international recommendations’. 
3.1. European Parliament 
The European Parliament has called for action on gender gaps in economic governance. A
report17 in June 2011 on Women and Business Leadership from the Committee on Women’s
Rights and Gender Equality was followed in July 2011 by the European Parliament adopting 
a resolution18 which supported the Commission’s action in March 2011 (see below, 4.2). 
The resolution called for the Commission to propose legislation, including quotas, by 2012 if
the steps taken by companies and member states to reach the targets of 30% female 
representation in management bodies by 2015 and 40% by 2020 are found to be 
inadequate. It also called for data on female representation in all types of companies in the
EU, and measures taken to increase representation, to be presented as soon as possible.  
The resolution referred to previous actions in this area, including the report and resolution
on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions. The Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs report19 called on the Commission to improve female representation on
the boards of directors of financial institutions, emphasising that greater diversity would 
tend to reduce the sector’s vulnerability to crises, contribute to stability, and improve the 
16	 Statements are not included if they appear to have no official sanction. For example, this report of the view of
the new Managing Director of the IMF was not included since it dates to when she held a previous position.
Christine Lagarde, when French Finance Minister, was quoted as stating: “I have now changed my mind about
quotas… however offensive” they may seem to their detractors, as she dropped her opposition to the quota bill 
in France in 2010. Boulton, L. and Hill, A. (16.11.10) ‘Lagarde embraces quotas at FT conference’, Financial 
Times. Available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a219537c-f1b0-11df-bb5a-00144feab49a.html#axzz1lX56eNkF. 
17 European Parliament, Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, Rapporteur Rodi Kratsa-
Tsagaropoulou (9.6.2011) Report on women and business leadership. A7-0210/2011. Available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2011­
0210+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
18	 European Parliament (2011) Resolution of 6 July 2011 on women and business leadership P7_TA(2011)0330.
Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-0110330&language=EN&ring=A7­
2011-0210. 
19	 European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Rapporteur Ashley Fox. (24.3.2011) 
Report on corporate governance in financial institutions. A7-0074/2011. Available at:
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A7-2011­
074&language=EN.
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
quality of debate and decision making. The resolution20 on Corporate Governance 
welcomed the Commission’s Green Paper and recognised that while a ‘one size fits all’
approach would be inappropriate given the diversity of both corporate structures and
approaches to their regulation across the EU, strong minimum standards were nevertheless 
required to ensure good governance across the financial sector. It called on the
Commission to: 
32. … submit a plan to bring about phased increases in gender diversity with the 
aim of achieving at least 30% representation for each gender on the boards of 
directors of financial institutions, to ensure that this target is met within a 
foreseeable period and to consider measures to strengthen diversity in terms of 
professional, social and cultural background. 
3.2. European Commission 
Capital Requirements Directive (Impact Assessment) 
An impact assessment (European Commission, 2011c: 158) accompanying the recast
Capital Requirements Directive reports on changes in board membership in countries
implementing gender quotas and comments: ‘If the goal is to accelerate the numbers of 
women on Boards in a short period of time, the figures… tend to show the effectiveness of 
legislated quotas in increasing the numbers of women directors.’ 
Equality between Women and Men 
The European Commission Strategy for Equality between Women and Men 2010-201521 
(2011e: 20), notes actions to be taken by the Commission regarding decision-making 
include: 
Consider targeted initiatives to improve the gender balance in decision making. 
The Commission recognises that getting more women into senior positions is crucial for 
Europe’s future economic growth and stability (European Commission, 2010a; European 
Commission, 2011d). The Strategy for Equality translates the principles in the EC Women’s 
Charter22 into specific measures. The Charter23 restates and strengthens the Commission’s
commitment to making equality between women and men a reality, with a ‘pledge to
dedicate the necessary resources to realise it’ (European Commission, 2010b: 3). One of 
the Charter’s (2010b: 4) principles regards equality in decision-making: 
We reaffirm our commitment to pursue the fairer representation of women and men
in positions of power in public life and the economy. We will use our powers, 
20	 European Parliament (2011) Resolution of 11 May 2011 on corporate governance in financial institutions.
P7_TA(2011)0223. Available at:
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2011-0223.
21	 European Commission (2011e) Strategy for Equality between Women and Men 2010-2015. Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union. Available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/strategy_equality_women_men_en.pdf. 
22	 Europa (5.3.10) IP/10/237 ‘EC strengthens its commitment to equality between women and men.’ Available 
at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/237&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&g 
uiLanguage=en. 
23	 European Commission (2010b) A Strengthened Commitment to Equality between Women and Men. A Women’s 
Charter. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/documents/pdf/20100305_1_en.pdf. 
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Gender Quotas in Management Boards
including Union incentive measures, to promote a greater share of women in
positions of responsibility. 
The Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Justice, Fundamental 
Rights and Citizenship, Viviane Reding stated that:  
"To get the engine of growth going again, Europe should make better use of
women's talents. I have not been an advocate of quotas for women in senior 
business posts in the past, but given the lack of progress in this area, we might in
the future have to consider taking initiatives at the European level. I plan to meet
with the chief executives of major publicly listed European companies in spring 2011
to discuss the situation and the scope for determined self-regulation. Depending on
the outcome of this dialogue with industry, I will consider whether further initiatives
will be necessary in 2012". 24 
In March 2011, the Commission met with business leaders and social partners to discuss 
measures to improve gender balance in decision making. The Commission will monitor
progress over the next 12 months.25 Reding said that she believed self-regulation could
make a difference, but if it fails then she was prepared to take further action at an EU level.
She called on publicly listed companies to sign up to the ‘Women on the Board Pledge for
Europe’ by March 2012, voluntarily committing to increasing women’s presence on 
corporate boards to 30% by 2015 and 40% by 2020. The Vice-President said that: 
"A year from now on International Women's Day (8 March 2012), the Commission 
will assess whether there is significant progress and whether credible self-regulatory
initiatives were developed to enhance women’s participation in decision-making. If
this has happened by March 2012, I will congratulate the European business world.
If it has not happened, you can count on my regulatory creativity". 26 
Corporate Governance
The Commission’s consultation on the EU’s Corporate Governance Framework27 has 
addressed the issue of Board diversity with regard to gender. Media reports28 also suggest
that mandatory quotas to ensure at least 30% female representation amongst directors on 
the boards of banks were originally included in the draft Capital Requirements Directive.
3.3. Council of Europe
Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)17 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
gender equality standards and mechanisms, which calls on governments to take or 
reinforce necessary measures to implement gender equality in practice, addresses the issue
24	 Europa (29.9.10) IP/10/1149 ‘Giving Europe a female touch’. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1149&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN& 
guiLanguage=en.
25	 Europa (1.3.11) IP/11/242 ‘EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding meets European business leaders to push 
for more women in boardrooms.’ Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/242&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&g 
uiLanguage=en. 
26	 Europa (1.3.11) MEMO/11/124 ‘EU Justice Commissioner Reding challenges business leaders to increase
women’s presence on corporate boards with “Women on the Board Pledge for Europe”.’ Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/124. 
27 European Commission (2011b) Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework. Available at: 
http://www.ecgi.org/commission/documents/eu_corporate_governance_framework_5apr2011_en.pdf. 
28 Treanor, J. (21.6.11) ‘EU calls for women to make up one-third of bank directors’, The Guardian. 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
of equality in economic life. The recommendation states that ‘elements indicating states’ 
political will and commitment to gender equality’ in this regard include:
30. vi) adoption/existence and implementation of legal and administrative measures 
to promote women’s equal participation in economic decision making, including
implementation of plans for gender balanced participation in boards and other 
decision-making structures of economic and financial institutions and private 
enterprises;29 
In 2009 the Committee of Ministers renewed its commitment to equality between women 
and men, adopting the ‘Declaration: Making gender equality a reality’ (COM (2009)68). The 
declaration urged member states to commit themselves fully to closing the gap between
law and reality, including action with regard to economic life:
2. … Adopt and implement specific policies and action plans at different levels and 
ensure their adequate financing; enable positive action or special measures to be 
adopted in order to achieve balanced participation, including representation, of
women and men in decision-making in all sectors of society, in particular in the 
labour market and in economic life as well as in political and public decision­
making;30 
In Resolution 1825 (2011), ‘More women in economic and social decision-making bodies’,
the Parliamentary Assembly stated that ‘a balanced representation of women and men at
all hierarchical levels, including top management, is a matter of justice, respect for human
rights and good governance’. The text added that such representation was conducive to 
productivity and profitability. The Assembly considered quotas positively, believing that the 
experience of quotas in the political arena could be transposed into the private sector and 
socio-economic domain. The Resolution included a call for member states to: 
7.10. 	set an example by adopting action plans aimed at improving the
representation of women in decision-making bodies in all branches of 
administration, at local, regional and central levels, as well as in state-owned 
companies; 
7.11.	 adopt legislation requiring that public and private institutions achieve a
minimum 40% representation of women in management and decision-making 
positions within a clearly defined time frame, and put in place the necessary
mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of such legislation; 
7.12. introduce the obligation for state-owned and large private	 companies to
guarantee a minimum 40% representation of women on their governing and 
management boards; 
And for member states to encourage companies, firms and associations in the private and
voluntary sector to: 
Burgess, K. and Tait, N. (26.6.11) ‘Quota plan for female bank chiefs faces axe’, Financial Times.
29	 Council of Europe (2011: 173) ‘Make equality in law a reality in fact: Compilation of recommendations of the
Committee of Ministers in the field of equality between women and men’. CM/Rec(2007)17. Available at:
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/03themes/gender-equality/Compilation_rec_CM_en.pdf. 
30	 Council of Europe ‘119th Session of the Committee of Ministers (Madrid, 12th May 2009). Declaration: Making
gender equality a reality’. COM(2009)68. Available at:
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1441675&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB0 
21&BackColorLogged=F5D383. 
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Gender Quotas in Management Boards
8.5. 	 introduce rules aimed at ensuring balanced representation of women and men
in top management and decision-making bodies, guaranteeing a minimum 
40% representation of women on governing and supervisory boards.31 
3.4. United Nations  
The UN32 Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women33 contains provisions on the equal participation of women and men in decision
making:  
Article 7
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the political and public life of the coun try and, in particular, shall ensure 
to women, on equal terms with men, the right:
(a) To vote in all elections an d public referenda and to be eligible for election to all
publicly elected bodies; 
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation
thereof and to h old public office and perform all public functions at all levels of
government;  
(c)	 To participate in non-governmental organizatio ns and associations concerned 
with the public and political life of the country.
Article 8
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal  
terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their 
Governments a t the international level and to participate in the work of international
organizations. 
Article 10 regards equality of rights in the field of education, crucial for women’s 
subsequent advancement to senior positions. Article 11 calls on State Parties to t ake
measures to ensure equality of men and women in the field of employment, including:  
1. (b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of 
the same criteria for selection in matters of employment;  
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, 
job security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive
vocational training and retraining, inclu ding apprenticeships, advanced 
vocational training and recurrent training;  
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in 
respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the 
evaluation of the quality of work;  
Article 11 contains provisions to prevent discrimination against women on t he grounds of
marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, including:  
31	 Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Resolution 1825 (2011) ‘More women in economic and social 
decision-making bodies.’ Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta11/ERES1825.htm. 
32 For further discussion of international actions on gender equality in employment, see: Wirth, L. (2004) 
Breaking through the Glass Ceiling: Women in Management. ILO: Geneva.  
33 CEDAW. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#intro. 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
2. (a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of
pregnancy or of ma ternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis 
of marital status;  
(b)	 To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable socia l benefits
without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances;  
Article 4 allows for the adoption of particular measures to address inequality:
1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating
de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination
as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence
the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be
discontinued whe n the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have
been achieved. 
The Beijing Platform for Action34 adopted in 1995 at the UN Fourth World Conference for 
Women calls for measures to ensure women’s equal access to and full participation in
power structures and decision making, and increase their capacity to participate in 
decision-making and leadership.35 It calls for action to: 
178. g) 	Eliminate occupational segregation, especially by promoting the equal 
participation of women in highly skilled jobs and senior management
positions, and through other measures, such as counselling and 
placement, that stimulate their on-th e-job career development and
upward mobility in the labour market…36 
The Women’s Empowerment Principles: Equality Means Business, the result of a 
collaboration between the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM, part of
UN Women) and the United Nations Global Compact, offer business guidance on how to
empower women in the workplace, marketplace and community.37 The principles are the 
fo llowing:
1. Establish high-level corporate leadership for gender equality. 
2. Treat all women and men fairly at work – respect and support human rights and
non discrimination. 
3. Ensure the health, safety and well-being of all women and men workers . 
4. Promote education, training and professional development for women. 
5. 	Implement enterp rise development, supply chain and marketing practices that 
empower women. 
6. Promote equality through community initiatives and advocacy.
7. Measure and publicly report on progress to achieve gender equality. 
34	 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. Available at:  
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/Beijing%20full%20report%20E.pdf. 
35	 Women in Power and Decision-making. Available at:  
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/decision.htm. 
36	 Women and the Economy. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/economy.htm. 
37	 See: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/human_rights/equality_means_business.html. 
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Gender Quotas in Management Boards
Under Principle 2, guidance includes:  
Implement gender-sensitive recruitment and retention practices and proactively
recruit and appoint women to managerial and executive positions and to the
corporate board of directors. 
Assure sufficient participation of women – 30% or great er – in decision-making and
governance at all levels and across all business areas.38 
The International Labour Organisation (a United Nations agency) promotes gender
equality in education and work, for example, through the 2009 International Labour 
Conference resolution concerning gender equality at the heart of decent work.39 Its polic y
on gender equality is operationalized in the ILO Gender Equality Action Plan 2010-2015.40 
In 2007, the World Bank (a United Nations agency) launched the Gender Action Plan: 
Gender Equality as Smart Economics.41 A transition plan for 2011-13 was delivered in 2010 
to apply the lessons from the Gender Action Plan initiatives.42 Both emphasise the
importance of women’s economic empowerment.  
3.5. OECD 
The OECD announced its Gender Initiative which addresses gend er equality in education,
employment and entrepreneurship in 2011. The initiative states:  
‘The need to introduce quotas for women in boardrooms or in senior management is 
being widely debated and, conditional on data availability, deserves further analysis 
to understand its benefits in terms of women's employment outcomes and firm 
performance.’ 43 
At the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) OECD 2010 Conference on Gender Equality in
Government and Business in Paris, one session discussed the pros and cons associated with 
quotas in politics and corporations. In the draft conclusions of the conference, participants:  
Noted that they may not necessarily be in support of quotas, but that evidence has
proven that the introduction of  quotas is  the most  efficient m eans to enhance 
women’s participation in both the public and the private sector.44 
38	 Women’s Empowerment Principles, available at:  
http://www.unwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Women-s-Empowerment-Principles_en.pdf. 
39	 International Labour Conference, 98th Session, 2009, Report VI Gender equality at the heart of decent work,
Geneva: ILO. Available at:  
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/elconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_105119.pdf
40 Available at:  
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/publication/wcms_141084.pdf. 
41 See Four-Year Progress report. Available at:  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/4year_progress_report_May5.pdf. 
42	 Available at:  
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/3360031241561860207/GAPtransitionplan_may25 
.pdf).
43	 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011: 38) Gender Initiative. Gender Equality:
Education, Employment, Entrepreneurship. Available at:  
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171239.pdf. 
44	 OECD (2010: 2) ‘Conclusions’ MENA-OECD Conference on Gender Equality in Government and Business. 
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/50/45157326.pdf
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3.6.	 European Women’s Lobby 
In their ‘Statement concerning EU Legislation for the Equal Representation of Women and
Men on Corporate Boards’45, the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) emphasise the 
importance of binding measures, referring to the example of Norway where non-binding 
legislation failed to have significant impact. The EWL comment on the actions already taken
by other countries and calls for European legislation to ensure a consistent approach across 
the EU. The EWL recommends that the EU and Member States:  
1. Adopt new legislation requiring European listed and non-listed public companies with
more than 50 employees and all state-owned companies to have 40% of women on
their boards of directors by 2015 and 50% by 2020, and that includes effective 
sanctions for non-compliance.  
2. Introduce measures to increase the number of women holding the positions of
company president or chair. 
3. Limit the number of board positions that one person can hold.  
4. Introduce accompanying measures to support enterprises in the implementation of
such measures and empower women.  
5. Use the on-going review of the EU public procurement regulation and the legislation 
on public procurement in Member States to make it possible to favour companies with 
a balanced representation of women and men in Boards and that implement other
measures to actively promote equality between women and men.
6. Address the root causes of women’s 	under-representation in economic decision-
making in corporations and in public institutions at national and EU level, including in
relation to work/life balance.46 
3.7.	 EC Network to Promote Women in Decision Making in Politics 
and the Economy 
The EC Network to Promote Women in Decision Making in Politics and the Economy was 
established in 2008, under the European Commission’s roadmap for equality between 
women and men 2006-10.47 Members include representatives of the European Platform of 
Women Scientists, European Women Lawyers’ Association, Women’s Forum for the
Economy and the Society. 
In a report on the quota-instrument and the different approaches adopted across Europe, 
the Network offer key points of advice to improve women’s representation in decision-
making functions on corporate boards, including one relating to legislation:
Quota legislation has proven to be the most effective tool to accelerate board
diversity and reach meaningful levels of women’s representation on companies’
boards. It should therefore be encouraged widely. 
A further point regards corporate governance codes: 
45	 European Women’s Lobby (2011) ‘Statement concerning EU Legislation for the Equal Representation of Women 
and Men on Corporate Boards’. Available at: http://www.womenlobby.org/spip.php?article2176&lang=en. 
46	 European Women’s Lobby (2011: 2) ‘Statement concerning EU Legislation for the Equal Representation of
Women and Men on Corporate Boards’. Available at:  
http://www.womenlobby.org/spip.php?article2176&lang=en. 
47	 Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women (2007) Opinion on EU Network of Women in 
Economic and Political Decision-Making Positions. Available at:  
 ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6235&langId=en. 
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Best practices on corporate governance codes need to be shared, especially in
countries where the debate has not started yet. Involvement of the private sector is
crucial and can be the precursor to significant change without legislation.48 
In their submission to the Consultation on EU Corporate Governance, the European Women 
Lawyers’ Association (EWLA) 49 stated that the most effective means of achieving greater 
gender balance on boards is by introducing quota requirements, accompanied by sanctions.
The EWLA stated their strong support for the Commissioner Viviane Reding’s initiative.
3.8. European Trade Union Confederation 
In response to a European Commission consultation on corporate governance, the 
European Trade Union Confederation agreed with the question ‘Should listed companies be 
required to ensure a better gender balance on boards’. They state that while they support
the Commissioner Viviane Reding’s initiative “Women on the Board Pledge for Europe”, 
which represents a voluntary commitment by publicly listed companies to increase women’s 
presence on corporate boards to 30 per cent by 2015 and to 40 per cent by 2020, they:  
… would like to note that voluntary approaches have not proven to be very 
successful in the past. Therefore, the Commission should consider introducing 
binding measures if companies do not improve the gender balance on boards.50 
3.9. World Economic Forum 
A quota for participants at the annual meeting in Davos was implemented for the first time 
in 201151 in an attempt to bring about greater gender equality amongst attendees. The 
Forum’s partners (around 100 companies) were told that out of every group of 5 senior
executives attending, 1 must be a woman. However, according to reports, female delegates
still accounted for only 17% of the total attending the meeting this year.52 
3.10. Conclusions 
The note identifies and reports on the positions and recommendations of nine international 
bodies on this matter.  These are: the European Parliament, European Commission, Council 
of Europe, United Nations (UN), OECD, European Women’s Lobby, EC Network to Promote 
Women in Decision Making in Politics and the Economy, European Trade Union
Confederation, and the World Economic Forum.   
All these bodies note the need to narrow the gender gap in economic decision-making and 
call for policy interventions into this process.  They vary as to whether they recommend 
48	 European Commission’s Network to Promote Women in Decision-making in Politics and the Economy (2011:
16) ‘The Quota-instrument: Different approaches across Europe. Working Paper’ available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/quota-working_paper_en.pdf. 
49	 EWLA (22.7.11) Statement. Consultation on Green Paper on EU Corporate Governance Framework available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/corporate-governance-framework/individual­
replies/ewla_en.pdf. 
50	 ETUC (2011: 7) Response. Consultation on the Green Paper ‘An EU Framework for Corporate Governance’, 
available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/corporate-governance-framework/registered­
organisations/etuc_en.pdf. 
51	 Moya, E. (1.1.11) ‘Davos imposes gender quota’, The Guardian.
52	 Martinson, J. (27.1.12) ‘Davos: if women are the future, where are they?’, The Guardian.
Reported on a meeting of the forum’s female leaders and the forum gender parity board to discuss a document
setting out best practices to increase diversity (e.g. mentoring and sponsorship), to be published in March
2012.
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voluntary measures or legal instruments. There are several statements that note the
slowness and lack of success of voluntary methods in reaching their targets.  There has 
been a recent increase in the use by national governments of legal measures to enforce 
quotas to narrow the gender gap on corporate management boards. 
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ANNEX I 

Legal instruments (quotas) to narrow the gender gap in corporate management
boards in European and OECD countries 
Country 
(Year 
introduced) 
Applicability Target for female
representation  
Year to be
reached  
Penalties for
non-
compliance 
Austria (2011)  Companies 
owned 50%+ by 
state. 
2 phases: 
25% 
35% 
2 phases: 
2013 
2018 
No sanctions. 
Belgium 
(2011) 
Phased timing by
company legal
status: 
State-owned 
companies 
Listed companies 
Small and
medium sized 
listed companies;
companies with 
less than 50% 
shares listed.
1/3 Phased 
timing by
company 
legal status:
2012 
2016 
2018 
Temporary loss
of financial and 
non-financial
benefits by 
board members. 
Denmark 
(2000) 
State-owned 
companies. 
30% Immediate 
Finland (2004) State-owned 
companies. 
40% 2005 
France (2011) Listed companies; 
companies with 
500+ employees
or turnover/asset 
of €50m+. 
2 phases: 
20% 
40% 
2 phases: 
2013 
2016 
Annulment of 
board 
appointments. 
Iceland (2006) State-owned and
municipal-owned 
companies. 
50% (or as close 
as possible) 
Immediate 
Iceland (2010) Public and private 
limited companies 
with 50+ 
employees.
40% 2013 
30
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Ireland (2004) State-owned 
companies. 
40% No deadline 
Israel (1993) State-owned 
companies. 
30% No deadline 
Italy (2011) Listed companies; 2 phases: 2 phases: Verbal sanction 
companies with 
public 
20% 2012 by regulatory 
body (Consob); 
participation and
state-ownership. 
30% 2015 fine; voiding of
board’s actions. 
Norway (2003) Public limited 
companies; state-
owned 
companies; inter-
municipal
companies. 
40% 2008 Official warning; 
fines; ultimate 
delisting and 
dissolution. 
Spain (2007) Public limited 
companies with 
250+ employees. 
40% 2015 No penalties;
incentive:
potential priority
status for
government 
contracts.
Switzerland 
(2006) 
State-owned 
companies. 
30% 2011 
The 
Netherlands
(2010) 
All companies 
(regardless of 
listing,
ownership,
private/public) 
with 250+ 
employees (or 
turnover criteria). 
30% in boards and 
senior 
management 
2016 No sanctions in 
law. Comply or 
explain in 
annual report 
and publish
action plan to
address. 
Sources:  
Davies, Lord (2011) Women on Boards. Pp 22-3.
European Commission’s Network to Promote Women in Decision-making in Politics and the 
Economy (2011) ‘The Quota-instrument: Different approaches across Europe. Working 
Paper’. Annex II. 
Pande, R. and Ford, D. (2011) ‘Gender Quotas and Female Leadership’. World Development
Report 2012, Gender Equality and Development, Background Paper. World Bank. Table 3.  
Visser, M. (2011) ‘Advancing gender equality in economic decision-making’, European 
Conference on Equality between Women and Men Brussels, September 19-20, 2011. Annex 
II. 
31
  
  
 
      
      
                                                 
    
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
   
 
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
ANNEX II 
Percentage of Presidents and Members of the Boards of Largest Companies who 
are Women in EU27 and Norway, 2003 and 201053 
President Members 
2003 2010 2003 2010 
EU-27 2 3 9 12 
Austria 0 0 6 9 
Belgium 2 0 6 10 
Bulgaria 0 13 11 11 
Cyprus 3 5 6 4 
Czech Republic - 9 - 12 
Denmark 2 0 11 18 
Estonia 0 7 15 7 
Finland 0 4 12 26 
France 2 3 5 12 
Germany 0 3 10 13 
Greece 0 0 7 6 
Hungary 4 8 11 14 
Ireland 0 5 7 8 
Italy 4 3 2 5 
Latvia 10 9 15 23 
Lithuania - 3 - 13 
Luxembourg 0 0 4 4 
Malta - 6 - 2 
Poland - 5 - 12 
Portugal 2 0 4 5 
Romania 0 0 17 21 
Slovakia 0 10 7 22 
Slovenia 6 6 20 10 
Spain 2 3 3 10 
Sweden 0 0 18 26 
The Netherlands 0 0 8 15 
United Kingdom 0 0 15 13 
Norway 2 13 20 39 
53	 SOURCE: European Commission Database: Women and Men in Decision Making. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making/database/business-finance/quoted­
companies/index_en.htm
 Notes to table:
- = not applicable , : = not available 

 Organisations covered The companies covered are the largest publicly listed companies in each country.
 
Publicly listed means that the shares of the company are traded on the stock exchange. The "largest"
 
companies are taken to be the members (max.50) of the primary blue-chip index, which is an index
 
maintained by the stock exchange covering the largest companies by market capitalisation and/or market
 
trades. Only companies which are registered in the country concerned are counted.

 Positions covered President: Chairman of the board of directors (supervisory board in case of separated
 
supervisory and executive functions); Members: Members of the board of directors (supervisory board in case 

of separated supervisory and executive functions). Count includes the chairman.

Main sources of data: Company websites; Stock-exchange websites; Company annual reports. 
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ANNEX III 
The implications of narrowing the gender gap on corporate boards for business  
While this report is focused on the merits of one route or another to narrowing the gender 
gap on corporate boards, this debate is taking place in the context of an adjacent debate
on the implications of narrowing the gender gap on corporate boards for business. This 
Annex summarises the discussion of the evidence on this issue. 
The narrowing of the gender gap on corporate management boards has been addressed in
debates on quotas as important for justice, skills and democracy (Storvik and Teigen, 
2010). 
There has been increasing notice of evidence that gender diversity on corporate boards is a 
‘good thing’ for business performance (e.g. McKinsey and Company, 2007; Thomson, 2011; 
Carter and Wagner, 2011), not only the ‘right thing’ from a justice perspective.  
While some (e.g. Fagan et al, 2011), consider that the empirical evidence is not definitive,
given the difficulties in attributing cause in observed correlations (Storvik and Teigen, 
2011: 10), an increasing number of studies suggest that increasing the diversity of boards 
and especially the inclusion of women improves company performance. One authoritative
and frequently cited assessment of the link between women on boards and company
performance was conducted by McKinsey and Company (2007). Across 101 companies, 
those with three or more women in senior management functions scored higher on
measures of organisational excellence (as evaluated by employees) than those companies
with no women at the top. A second analysis selected 89 European listed companies with 
the highest level of gender diversity in top management. Examination of company financial
performance (in terms of return on equity, operating result and stock price growth) showed 
that these companies, on average, had a higher performance than the average for their
sector. 
In another study using data from 127 large American firms, Erhardt et al (2003) found a
positive association between executive board diversity and firm financial performance (as
measured by returns on assets and investments). 
Warth (2009) also emphasises the benefits that can accrue to companies. She notes that 
creating better opportunities for women to progress in corporations widens the talent pool
for firms and can improve both recruitment and retention of talent, which also reduces 
costs in terms of hiring and training new employees.  
While there have been reports of a link between the presence of women on boards and 
poorer performance (e.g. Judge, 2003), this may be explained by what has been referred
to as the ‘glass-cliff’ phenomenon. Ryan and Haslam’s (2005; 2007) study suggest women 
are over-represented in precarious leadership positions. They examined archival data on 
performance of FTSE 100 companies before and after appointment of a male or female 
board member. They find that during period of stock market decline those companies
appointing women to their boards were more likely to have experienced consistently bad 
performance in preceding months than those appointing men.  
Evidence also suggests that achieving a ‘critical mass’ of women may be important for the
positive influence of having women on corporate boards (Erkut et al, 2008; Rose, 2007; 
Torchia et al, 2011; McKinsey and Company, 2007). Using survey data from 317 Norwegian 
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firms, for example, Torchia et al (2011) found that a critical mass of at least three women 
on company boards was required to exert a significant effect on the level of a firm’s
organizational innovation, with a mediating role played by the boards’ involvement in the 
strategic process (e.g. decision-making on goals). They suggest that as a minority of only
one or two, women remained ‘tokens’.  
While the number of female chairs in Norwegian companies remains low (Storvik and 
Teigen, 2011; Fagan et al, 2011), some evidence suggests women’s presence on boards of 
directors does lead to ‘spillovers’ (Matsa and Miller, 2011). Data on female share of board
membership and the top five executives from a large sample of publicly traded US
companies indicate that female representation on corporate boards had a subsequent 
impact on the gender composition of top management. Matsa and Miller suggest that this 
relationship could be amplified in the long-term by, for example, the presence of more
female role models and mentors.  
Since the financial crisis, an increasing amount of attention has focused on the association
between gender and governance, with the proposal that gender diversity on boards is
linked to improved governance and that diversity could have actually lessened the impact
of the financial crisis (Davies, 2011; House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2010). 
Evidence seems to suggest that diversity on boards goes some way to preventing ‘group 
think’ (Thomson, 2011; House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2010). 
It has been observed that even in Norway there has been a relatively limited impact on the
percentage of women leading companies as CEO or Chair. Nevertheless, at 13% it is still 
far higher than the EU 27 average of 3% in 2010 and evidence suggests that greater
representation at the level of boards could have positive effects on women’s representation 
at more senior levels (Matsa and Miller, 2011; Joy, 2008; Terjesen and Singh, 2008). 
Quotas can be seen as one means of achieving the ‘critical mass’ necessary to bring about 
changes in board dynamics and wider corporate cultures, and can be used to ‘kick-start’
attitudinal change (Erkut et al, 2008; Villiers, 2010).  
Quotas have been seen as one  means of ensuring that talent is not wasted, and  with  
regard to the proposed positive association between gender diversity and improved
performance, Thomson (2011: 159) concludes that while association does not mean cause: 
‘It seems fair to say that insofar as the business case for appointing more women to boards 
is provable, it is proven’.
Quotas have the advantage of simultaneously achieving another European aim, the reform 
of corporate governance in interests of economic stability and preventing further financial 
crises. In this way, economic growth, governance reform and gender diversity should not
be seen as discrete challenges but rather closely interconnected issues (Thomson, 2011).  
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